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INTRODUCTION
The prosecution of Irek Hamidullin in an Article III federal court crystallized the result of years of heated debate
amongst legal scholars, the military, and, most importantly, the executive branch. For the first time in the history of the
United States, a military detainee enemy combatant was brought from Afghanistan to the United States to stand for
a criminal trial in an Article III federal court. The defendant, Irek Hamidullin, was a known associate of the Taliban
who orchestrated an attack in Afghanistan in November of 2009 and was captured by American forces thereafter. This
concept--bringing a foreign combatant terrorist into our country for a criminal prosecution in a civilian tribunal for war-
like conduct that took place on a foreign battlefield--has left many people, even federal judges, confused.
This article aims to offer a solution for prosecuting terrorists consistently and efficiently in the ever-expanding world
of modern warfare. It argues that our country's approach to prosecuting terrorists has been wildly inconsistent, and
that clarity and consistency are required moving forward. The executive branch, which directs the path the Department
of Justice and military take in these arenas, has been the main instigator of the inconsistency. The decision whether
to prosecute foreign, non-citizen terrorists in an Article III federal court or military tribunal/commission has become
politicized, allowing political winds to dictate policy, albeit an inconsistent, unprincipled one. 1  The Bush administration
sought to prosecute terrorists in military commissions. 2  Conversely, Barack Obama prefers Article III federal *594
courts where procedure and due process are more prevalent. 3  These inconsistent approaches, which have been more
criticized than applauded, provided a band-aid approach for a bullet hole wound that is our country's recent, and
potentially future, approach to the prosecution of terrorists. This paper argues for a common sense, two-pronged
approach. First, treat combatant terrorists as combatant Prisoners of War, prosecuting them in military commissions
while treating non-combatant, domestic terrorists as such and prosecute them in Article III federal courts under domestic
criminal law. Second, modernize the law of war so that it is applicable to the extremely different and constantly evolving
realities of combat and war in the world today.
War has changed, and so should the laws tailored to govern its conduct. Though it is the prerogative of the President to
exercise authority over foreign affairs and our military as Commander-in-Chief, attempts at grand schematic shifts every
four to eight years have proven difficult to implement. 4  Ultimately, this leaves the judiciary and legislatures confused in
the muddled aftermath. The unfortunate truth is that terrorism is not going away. Therefore, it is the duty of our federal
government to provide modern and practical leadership to its citizens, military, and the international community.
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Part I of this comment will provide a thorough historical background on this topic. It will provide background on
the controlling legal doctrines in this area and a detailed history of the prosecution of Irek Hamidullin. Part II will
provide helpful background on military commissions. It will discuss the jurisdiction, chargeable offenses, and overall
procedural and substantive operations of military commissions. Part III will explain the approaches of the Bush and
Obama administrations and how the legal, political, and humanitarian debate we find ourselves in today is, in large part,
due to inconsistent approaches from the executive branch. The executive decisions on where to prosecute terrorists were
made using political considerations, rather than creating sustainable policy. Simple party politics and a public outcry
for prosecutions guided policy that has created the current tornado of interests and arguments in this area, rather than
principles of law.
*595  Part IV will present a solution focused on the need to distinguish whether the terrorist is a combatant or non-
combatant terrorist. The outcome of this inquiry will determine things like trial venue and other procedural rights.
Part IV argues that military courts and Article III federal courts have a distinct role in prosecuting terrorists. We have
the ability to use both forums in the ways they were intended. Part IV will also discuss why military commissions
must prosecute combatant terrorists, the drawbacks of trying combatant terrorists in federal courts, and the updates
needed to bring the law of war into modern combat. This will show that combatant terrorists should be tried in military
commissions. This solution will lead to a more practical application of the law by bringing the military courts into the
modern age to effectuate their usage, promoting less forum shopping on behalf of the government, and instilling more
consistency in application from one administration to the next.
Before delving into the specifics on military commissions and executive treatment, one must have a general understanding
of the legal and historical backdrop to the law of war and how it was applied in Hamidullin.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND HAMIDULLIN
A. The Geneva Convention Protects POWs
The Conventions establish varying degrees of treatment afforded to combatants and other actors in theatres of war. 5
The Geneva Conventions (“Conventions”) were adopted as treaties--“formal, written agreement[s] between sovereign
states.” 6  The Conventions according to the International Community of the *596  Red Cross (“ICRC”), “form the
core of international humanitarian law, which regulates the conduct of armed conflict and seeks to limit its effects. They
protect people not taking part in hostilities and those who are no longer doing so.” 7  The Conventions were promulgated
in 1949 and included four separate treaties establishing detailed rules for four separate status groups: (1) Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field; (2) Convention for the
Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces; (3) Convention Relative to the
Treatment of the Prisoners of War; and (4) Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 8
The status group relevant to this article is the third, the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(“GPW”). 9  Jean Pictet, one of the foremost historical authorities on the law of war, stated that “[e]very person in enemy
hands must have some status under international law: he is either a prisoner of war ... a civilian ... or ... a member of
the medical personnel .... There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the law.” 10  As its title
describes, the GPW is meant to govern the treatment of Prisoners of War (“POWs”) depending upon their combatant
status. 11
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For purposes of this comment, the most important article of the GPW is Article 4. Article 4 provides detailed criteria
that must be met for a combatant to qualify as a prisoner of war. 12  Article 4(A)(1) states that any member of the armed
forces of a High Contracting Party 13  are deemed prisoners of war if they fall into *597  the enemy's hands. 14  This
codifies what we normally associate with the practices of warfare--if two sovereign states are in conflict, any detained
member of the opposing force is a POW. The second category under Article 4(A)(2) pertains to militias and volunteer
corps. 15  It lays out four elements that must all be met in order to gain POW status if not granted under 4(A)(1). 16
These four requirements are:
“(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly; and
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.” 17
There is a general consensus the test outlined in Article 4(A)(2) is what should be used in assessing whether an individual
is a POW, 18  and has been used to determine the same for terrorists in the modern context. 19
At its core, Article 4 determines whether the detained individual is a lawful combatant POW or unlawful combatant. 20  A
lawful combatant enjoys the “greatest protection under international law pursuant to the GPW.” 21  Most importantly,
a lawful combatant is allowed to engage in the conflict and may not be prosecuted for lawful acts of war because they
are entitled to “combat immunity.” This means they may “kill or wound enemy combatants, *598  destroy other enemy
military objectives and cause incidental civilian casualties” without fear of prosecution. 22  Basically, combatants can
engage in hostilities with immunity if they are doing so legally under the laws of war, similar to police officers policing with
immunity if they are doing so lawfully under relevant state and federal law. Lawful combatants can only be prosecuted
for violations of the laws of war. 23  The purpose behind detaining a POW is to prevent them from continuing to fight,
not to punish them for their actions on the battlefield. 24  When investigated or prosecuted, the treaty affords POWs
certain protections, such as “humane treatment, limits on interrogation, [and] trial rights equivalent to those afforded
soldiers of the capturing military.” 25  POWs must also be returned to their homeland country at the conclusion of the
conflict, unless they have been charged or convicted of a crime. 26  Mistreatment of POWs is considered a grave breach
of the Conventions and international humanitarian law in general. 27
Conversely, unlawful combatants who fail to meet the requirements of Article 4(A)(2) do not receive the same treatment.
Unlawful combatants participate in hostilities in varying degrees, but are not afforded the same combatant immunity
that lawful combatants are. 28  Unlawful combatants can include “civilians ... noncombatant members of the armed
forces who, in violation of their protected status, actively engage in hostilities,” 29  and “irregular *599  or part-time
combatants, such as guerillas ....” 30  By choosing to engage in the conflict, unlawful combatants waive their combatant
immunity and, if captured, can be tried under municipal law even if their conduct complied with the laws of war. 31
There are certain provisions that apply to all the conventions. The most relevant of those provisions are Common Articles
2, 3, and 5. Common Article 2 states that “the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
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other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is
not recognized by one of them.” 32  The term “High Contracting Parties” means any state that was a signatory to the
convention. 33  If the party in question is not a High Contracting Party, it must “embrace[], by words or actions, the
provisions of the GPW” for it to apply to the conflict it is engaged in. 34  It is important to note that there is disagreement
among scholars whether Common Article 2 must be satisfied for the other Articles of the GPW to apply. 35
Common Article 3 governs non-international armed conflicts that occur in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties. 36  For the purposes of the Conventions, an international armed conflict is a conflict that occurs in more than
one state, whereas a non-international armed conflict is one that occurs within only one state. 37  The characterization is
purely a geographic one, and it gives insight to the type of wars and conflicts that occurred at the time of drafting. Scholars
agree that Common Article 3 provides the baseline treatment of all detainees, 38  regardless of the conflict. 39  “[It] sets
forth minimum standards for treating *600  enemy fighters.” 40  Common Article 3 embodies the humanitarian purpose
of the Conventions, representing a shift from protecting the interests of sovereign states to protecting the interests of the
each individual human being involved in the conflict. 41
Lastly, Common Article 5 of the Conventions requires that if there is any doubt as to the status of the detainee under
GPW Article 4, whether they are a POW or not, those individuals must be protected by the Convention until a “competent
tribunal” has determined their status. 42  These are known as Article 5 reviews. 43
Though the Convention's importance for the international community cannot be overstated, it did leave questions open
that have proven to be difficult for the United States, and the international community, to consistently answer. 44
B. United States v. Hamidullin: A Combatant Tried By Civilians
American forces captured Irek Hamidullin (“Hamidullin”) in 2009 in the aftermath of a failed attack at Camp Leyza, a
border crossing between Afghanistan and Pakistan, in an infamous region called the Khowst province. 45  According to
the indictment and motions filed by both parties, Hamidullin had been affiliated with the Taliban since 2001. 46  When
the mission failed, Hamidullin *601  attempted to retreat while carrying an AK-47 but was shot and apprehended. 47
There was ample argument, both in the briefs and at trial, as to whether Hamidullin ever fired his weapon. 48  At trial,
the government presented both a graphic video taken from a helicopter of bombs and machine gun fire being unleashed
upon the insurgents, and video footage of Hamidullin's interrogation. 49  No Americans or Afghan police were killed
or injured during the attack. 50
After being captured, the Department of Defense held Hamidullin at the United States Parwan Detention Facility at
Bagram Airfield for five years. 51  The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) took custody of Hamidullin to transport
him to the United States to face criminal charges. 52  The charges against Hamidullin listed in his fifteen-count indictment
included: (i) providing material support to a known terrorist organization; (ii) attempting to destroy a United States
military aircraft; and (iii) attempting to kill a United States citizen. 53  Hamidullin plead not guilty to all the charges. 54
The gravity of this case makes it different from most of the terrorism related cases that take place in Article III federal
courts. Historically, those cases involved habeas petitions at the appellate *602  level, detainee treatment at Guantanamo
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bay, or individuals who supported terrorists through “financing, recruiting, or other activities outside the theater of
war.” 55  This case involved a “combatant captured on the battlefield, accused of being [a Taliban] commander of a 2009
attack against United States and Afghan forces.” 56
Hamidullin's trial was set for August of 2015 in the Richmond division of the Eastern District of Virginia. 57  Hamidullin's
principal defense at both the motions hearing and the trial was that he was a lawful combatant who could not be
prosecuted because his acts were lawful under the law of war. 58  In addition, Hamidullin's attorneys argued that under
the Conventions he was a lawful enemy combatant, and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of a civilian court
for a criminal trial. 59  His attorneys argued that the Taliban, as a group, satisfies the four requirements under GPW
Article 4(A)(2) of the Conventions, and therefore, Taliban combatants would be lawful combatants with combatant
immunity. 60  Thus, if Hamidullin had combatant immunity, he could not be prosecuted anywhere for allegedly shooting
at United States aircraft or soldiers. 61  His attorneys argued throughout the litigation that this case was the “first of
its kind--a foreign national taken off a battlefield and brought into a U.S. courtroom for a criminal *603  trial.” 62
Hamidullin's attorneys said “[t]his prosecution is fundamentally unfair,” and that “[t]his is a unique case. It has presented
the court with issues that have never been presented in court before.” 63
On August 7, 2015, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all fifteen counts brought against Hamidullin after only eight
hours of deliberation. 64  John P. Carlin, Assistant United States Attorney General for national security, said “[t]his
case once again demonstrates our resolve to find and bring to justice, using all available tools, those who target U.S.
citizens and interests around the world.” 65  On December 3, 2015, Judge Henry Hudson sentenced Hamidullin to life
imprisonment plus thirty years for his conduct in the attack. 66
Now, having provided sufficient background of the controlling law in this area and the story of Hamidullin, what follows
is a breakdown of what military commissions are and how they operate.
II. WHAT ARE MILITARY COMMISSIONS?
A. Military Commissions Prosecute Law of War Violations and the President Has Power Over Them
The United States armed forces use military commissions to prosecute violations of the laws of war, usually committed
by captured enemy combatants. 67  A military commission may try any non-U.S. citizen who is determined to be an
“unlawful enemy *604  combatant”. 68  The offenses typically charged in military commissions are any violation of
the law of war, war crimes, and related terrorism offenses. 69  The Military Commissions Act (“MCA”) also allows for
prosecution of offenses such as conspiracy and material support of terrorism (“MST”), though there is plentiful debate
on whether those are war crimes and punishable by commissions. 70
Article I of the United States Constitution, specifically the Define and Punish Clause therein, provides the “source of
authority to prosecute enemy soldiers for violations of the law of nations (or war crimes) in military commissions.” 71
Congress's power to move criminal prosecutions to a different forum is also limited in Article III and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, which all contain various aspects of jury requirements. 72
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Along with other noted exceptions, 73  the Supreme Court has recognized an exception allowing military commissions
to try enemy belligerents who violate the international law of war. 74  Military commissions are not meant “to maintain
internal discipline within the U.S. armed forces (courts-martial) or to fill a jurisdictional gap based on exigency (military
tribunals conducted during martial law or in occupied territory).” 75  Commissions are meant to prosecute violations of
the law of war by non-citizen, lawful and unlawful combatants.
The military commissions in use today are known as law-of-war commissions and were upheld by the Supreme Court in
Ex Parte Quirin. 76  Though judicial and scholarly commentary has been critical, “Quirin's holding--that the Constitution
allows the exercise of military jurisdiction over enemy belligerents who violate the law of war--remains intact.” 77
The Court stood by this *605  in Yamashita and Eisentrager, justifying the use of commissions and establishing that
“international law recognized the authority of the military commission to try the particular offense in question.” 78
When read broadly, Quirin can be interpreted to allow the President to choose the forum--military or civilian--where
an enemy soldier who has violated the law of war can be prosecuted. 79  These commissions operate under a criminal
exception to Article III jurisdiction based on the status of the offender and nature of the alleged offense. 80
B. Military Commissions Try War Crimes, But Historical
Definitions of War Crimes Are Murky When Applied to Terrorists
Much of the debate discussing the problems associated with military commissions centers around its lack of sufficient
standards for procedure and due process. 81  The international community and human rights activists attack the
commission system, arguing they are inherently unfair, put defendants at a comparative disadvantage, and do not
comport with international law. 82  Conversely, those in favor of commissions argue that the implemented procedures
are sufficient and the idea of guaranteeing foreign terrorists the same constitutional protections afforded to everyday
citizen criminals is preposterous. 83
*606  Military commissions are not “Article III” courts, meaning their power does not derive from Article III of the
United States Constitution. 84  Therefore, the same constitutional requirements that attach to Article III courts do not
apply to military commissions. 85  For example, defendants before a military commission have no right to demand a
jury trial. 86  Historically, military commissions have applied the same procedural rules used in courts-martial. 87  The
commissions under the MCA have jurisdiction over those who “have engaged in hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners, or who have purposefully and materially supported such hostilities.” 88  They cannot be used to try
United States citizens. 89  The MCA dictates that a qualified military judge preside over the panels of five military officers,
except when the death penalty is being sought, in which case twelve panel members are required. 90  The President, or
his subordinates, has the authority to “write procedural rules, interpret them, enforce them, and amend them.” 91  The
MCA also lists the minimum set of rights afforded to those accused. 92
*607  The MCA, in terms of sentencing power, may sentence a defendant to “any punishment not forbidden by [the
MCA or the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”)], including the penalty of death ....” 93  A death sentence
cannot be imposed until the commission proceedings have finished, all appeals have been exhausted, and the President
approves the sentence. 94
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The commissions' post-trial procedures have arguably been opposed more than any other realm of the commissions. 95
The first line of appellate review under the MCA is the Court of Military Commission Review (“CMCR”). The CMCR
cannot grant relief “unless an error of law prejudiced a substantial trial right of the accused.” 96  Similar to the UCMJ and
Article III federal courts, the MCA “prohibits the invalidation of a verdict or sentence due to an error of law unless the
error materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused.” 97  A defendant may appeal any issue of law to a CMCR.
After exhausting the CMCR, the accused may then appeal to the D.C. Circuit. Lastly, the United States Supreme Court
may review the decision by the D.C. Circuit if certiorari is granted. Additionally, an accused may petition the convening
authority for *608  a new trial “on the ground of newly discovered evidence or fraud on the military commission,” if
done within two years after the conviction becomes final. 98
Per the 2006 MCA statute, commissions may be used to try “offenders or offenses [designated] by statute or by the law of
war.” 99  The MCA of 2006 granted the President express authority to convene military commissions, thereby eliminating
the requirement to adhere exactly to the procedural rules of courts-martial. 100  Though this moved the commissions
closer to courts-martial--in terms of procedural sufficiency--than they were before Hamdan, the same groups that took
issue with the procedures used before continue to demand heightened procedural and due process guarantees. 101
The MCA of 2006 defines “unlawful enemy combatant” as “a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities ... who is not a lawful enemy combatant” or as “a person who, before,
on, or after the date of the enactment of the [MCA of 2006], has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant
by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal [(“CSRT”)] or another competent tribunal” determined by the President or
Secretary of Defense. 102  This is the personal jurisdiction of the MCA. 103  As previously discussed in case law and
general discussion, those critical of commissions, including courts, take great issue with treating offenses such as material
support and conspiracy as violations of the law of war because of the debate and uncertainty about whether they are
indeed violations. 104  Courts have also found CSRTs to not be competent tribunals *609  for purposes of satisfying
Common Article 5 of the Geneva Convention. 105
The MCA has subject matter jurisdiction over “any offense made punishable by this chapter or the law of war when
committed by an alien unlawful enemy combatant.” 106  The statute provides a lengthy list of triable offenses under
military commissions, though the list was not intended to be exhaustive. 107  Some of the listed offenses include: terrorism,
providing material support for terrorism, wrongfully aiding the enemy, and conspiracy and attempts to commit those
defined acts. 108  The contents of this list elicit controversy across different interest groups, including the international
community and the judiciary. For instance, in Hamdan, a plurality of the Supreme Court agreed conspiracy is not a
war crime under the traditional law of war. 109  Additionally, historical precedent has not supported the inclusion of
“material support for terrorism” as a war crime. 110
From a geographic perspective, the law of war has historically applied within the territorial boundaries of an armed
conflict between two belligerents. 111  Generally, it has not applied “to conduct occurring on the territory of neutral states
or on territory not under the control of a belligerent, to conduct that preceded the outbreak of hostilities, or to conduct
during hostilities that do not amount to an armed conflict.” 112
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*610  Importantly, a war crime generally requires a “nexus between the conduct and armed hostilities.” 113  Throughout
the Military Commission Instruction No. 2 (“MCI No.2”) is the phrase, “in the context of and was associated with armed
conflict,” which is how the nexus is spelled out therein. 114  The definition does not require “a declaration of war” or
“ongoing mutual hostilities.” 115  It states that “[a] single hostile act or attempted act” can be enough for the nexus
so long as its magnitude or severity rises to the level of an “armed attack” or an “act of war” or the
number, power, stated intent or organization of the force with which the actor is associated is such
that the act or attempted act is tantamount to an attack by an armed force. 116
In traditional armed conflict, such as either of the world wars, it is generally easy to identify when hostilities begin and
end. 117  Today's style of conflict is different. The Global War on Terror (“GWOT”) “does not have clear boundaries in
time or space, nor is it entirely clear who the belligerents are.” 118  Modern conflicts often do not have a specific start
and end date. 119  Further, the groups in conflict are often not traditional armies of sovereign nations that fight for, and
owe allegiance to, their home country. 120  Thus, the international community's war on terrorism is likely to be a never-
ending, sliding scale of conflict that opposes the strongest, most threatening radical group at the time. In light of this
amorphous, flexible, yet frightening system of warfare, the legal rules adjoining that system must be specifically tailored
to meet its demands.
The preceding discussion on the legal boundaries that military commissions operate within establishes the requisite
background needed in order to appreciate how they have been used. As will be *611  discussed in Part III, the Executive
Branch has largely used these military commissions inconsistently and without principled legal application.
III. THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERING EXECUTIVE TREATMENT
A. The Bush Administration: 9/11 and the Catch-All Response
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress responded swiftly and strongly by passing the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists (“AUMF”) on September 14, 2001. 121  This resolution
granted the President the authority to use “all necessary and appropriate force against those who” had “planned,
authorized, committed, or aided” the 9/11 attacks. 122  President Bush's administration dubbed the campaign the “Global
War on Terror” and his legal team argued it granted him wide and broad presidential war powers because it was “vital
to give the Chief Executive the power he needed to keep America safe.” 123  Following the passing of the AUMF, the
Bush administration began to engage in practices and policies that the international community regarded as conflicting
with established international law and principles. 124
In November 2001, through a military order, President Bush declared that all accused terrorists were to be tried by secret
military commissions. 125  As part of the order, President Bush stated that detainees subject to these commissions would
have no recourse in the United States courts to appeal a verdict or be provided any opportunity to obtain relief. 126
John Bellinger III, legal advisor to the National Security Council under President Bush, criticized the military order,
stating a “small group of administration *612  lawyers drafted the president's military order establishing the military
commissions, but without the knowledge of the rest of the government, including the national-security adviser, me, the
secretary of state, or even the C.I.A director.” 127
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On February 7, 2002, President Bush classified all members of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and related forces as unlawful
enemy combatants. 128  As previously discussed, 129  the unlawful combatant classification strips these groups of the
protections afforded to POWs under the Third Geneva Convention. 130  After an intense legal debate between the State
Department, the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and the Office of the Vice President, the Bush
administration concluded that the Taliban failed to meet the requisite four-pronged test under GPW Article 4(A)(2),
discussed above. 131  The disagreement pertained to how the government should apply the four factors and whether
combatants were the only groups intended to receive POW status under the GPW. 132
Those who disagreed with the Bush administration's position cited instances where the United States gave POW status
to certain “non-conventional” groups, most notably the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War. 133  They asserted that even
if POW status is not granted to the detainees, the detainees should still be afforded the protection of Common Article
3, which, as described above, *613  “contains minimal wartime protections” for all combatants. 134  Jack Goldsmith,
who was a legal adviser for the Department of Defense and later head of the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”), stated
that amidst the internal legal struggles going on during this time, the result created “a giant hole, a legal hole of minimal
protections, minimal law.” 135
Historians observe that the approach of the Bush administration was simply a continuation of the Reagan
administration. 136  In 1980, amendments to the Conventions, known as Protocol I, attempted to classify non-uniformed
fighters who failed to follow the laws of war as POWs and have the Conventions protect them. 137  The Senate never
ratified Protocol I, and this policy determination lived on to become the analysis the Bush administration relied on
post-9/11. 138  Most allied countries did ratify Protocol I by 2001. 139
Shortly after September 11, 2001, President Bush and Congress determined that the United States was at war. President
Bush and his legal team took the declaration of war as the triggering event that activated the Executive's war powers and
interpreted those powers broadly. 140  The Bush administration generally followed one of three options when dealing
with terrorists: (1) indefinitely detain the terrorist, classifying them as an enemy combatant, without judicial review; (2) if
they were non-citizens, charge the individuals, whether lawful or unlawful combatants, and try them in military tribunals
for law of war violations; or (3) classify them as unlawful combatants and try them in Article III federal courts. 141  This
afforded the President a great degree of *614  breadth when determining whether to bring charges (if any), what kinds
of charges to bring, and what forum to choose--all while knowing what law would be applied.
The selection of Guantanamo Bay as the location to detain these individuals was deliberately planned. Ever since
acquiring jurisdictional treaty rights in 1903, “all U.S. presidents had taken the position that aliens held [at Guantanamo
Bay] were without either statutory or constitutional habeas corpus rights.” 142  Consequently, there was no obligation
to provide due process rights to the individuals being held at Guantanamo Bay. 143  Therefore, according to the Bush
administration, because al-Qaeda did not observe the rule of law, the Convention on POW treatment did not apply. 144
What the procedures used at Guantanamo Bay initially lacked, that Common Article 5 requires, is for a competent
tribunal to determine the status of the detainee if there is any doubt under GPW Article 4. From the text of GPW Article
4, these “[Common] Article 5 reviews” require an individual determination by a tribunal, not a group determination by an
individual. 145  In 2002, the Inter-American Commission on Humans Rights asked the United States to hold the required
tribunals to determine detainees' statuses. 146  The administration responded, saying that under the President's broad
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executive power, he was justified in making a status determination for the entire group (al-Qaeda), therefore nullifying
the need for any Common Article 5 reviews. 147
So, not only did the Bush administration deny the alleged terrorists their review by a competent tribunal, guaranteed and
recognized by international law and the international community, but it also denied them any access, regardless of the
charge or procedural posture, to the United States court system. Ultimately, as the direction of the Bush administration
was taking hold, it also began to be challenged in the courts. 148
*615  In 2004, the Supreme Court in both Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush, decided against the Bush
administration. 149  At issue in Hamdi was whether a United States citizen, detained as an enemy combatant due to
his affiliations with the Taliban, could seek independent review assessing the legality of his detention. 150  Hamdi was
captured in the Afghan combat zone, detained there for a period of time, and then brought to the United States. 151
Most of the Justices agreed that President Bush was authorized to detain persons under the AUMF. 152  However,
the fundamental disagreement among them was whether the federal judiciary has the right to involve itself in matters
generally overseen by the executive and legislative branches, per the Constitution. 153  Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist,
Kennedy, and Breyer jointly held that a “citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant
must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual
assertions before a neutral decision-maker.” 154
In response, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld set up Combatant Status Review Tribunals (“CSRTs”) to provide
added procedural due process in this area. 155  These CSRTs were established to determine whether individuals detained
at Guantanamo Bay were “properly classified as enemy combatants and to permit each detainee the opportunity to
contest such designation.” 156
President Bush's second term in the White House exhibited a different legal approach to the war on terror largely
due to the Supreme Court's treatment of his administration's agenda towards detaining and prosecuting terrorists. In
2006, the Court issued *616  a 5-3 ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which challenged the administration's use of military
commissions without congressional authority to do so. 157  Hamdan involved a Yemini national who was part of the
Taliban, captured abroad, transported to Guantanamo Bay, and ultimately deemed eligible for trial by a military
commission for the offense of conspiracy to commit a violation of the law of war. 158  The Court took issue with the fact
that the military commissions had been established by presidential order and not by express authority from Congress. 159
The Hamdan Court's main holding was that the CSRTs did not comply with the UCMJ or the law of war, as incorporated
in the UCMJ and embodied in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which the Court held applicable to the armed conflict with
al Qaeda. 160  The Court held that the commissions did not meet the requisite standards from a procedural perspective,
noting that they needed to be on par with court-martial proceedings, established by the UCMJ, and used for American
military officers. 161  The Court said that the Bush administration could not proceed with military commissions without
congressional approval and that Common Article 3 of the Conventions applied to the Global War on Terror. 162
Consequently, the Court effectively guaranteed detainees the rights of humane treatment and legal process. National
Public Radio said that the ruling was “the most important ruling on executive power in decades, or perhaps ever.” 163
Congress quickly reacted to the Hamdan ruling, passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006. 164  The aim of the
legislation *617  was to create procedures that the commissions system could use while still remaining within the confines
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that the Court laid out in Hamdan. 165  The legislation, however, functioned as more of a push back against the Court's
ruling rather than a grateful appreciation for having been given direction. The Act authorized substantive and procedural
aspects of the commissions system that the Court struck down in Hamdan, including a broadened definition of “unlawful
enemy combatant,” narrowed interpretations of the Geneva Conventions, and stripping the Supreme Court of habeas
corpus jurisdiction over enemy combatants, among others. 166  Barack Obama, a United States Senator at the time the
Act was passed, criticized the Bush administration for timing the legislation close to the midterm elections, so that no
one from Congress would oppose the Bill for fear of retaliatory political attack advertisements. 167  Meanwhile, the
international community continued to disavow the attempts at progress by the Bush Administration. In 2007, the Council
of Europe demanded extension of POW status to detainees or alternatively that the United States at least satisfy Common
Article 5 and require a “competent tribunal” to determine their appropriate status. 168
Two years after Hamdan, the Court revisited this arena in the case of Boumediene, which was also decided against the Bush
administration. 169  Boumediene involved a consolidation of cases regarding enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay
who had filed habeas petitions similar to the one at issue in Hamdan. The Court held that aliens detained at Guantanamo
Bay were entitled to challenge the legality of their detention through habeas petitions and that a provision of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, which stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction, was an unconstitutional suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus. 170  As part *618  of the AUMF, the Deputy Secretary of Defense set up CSRTs to initially
determine the status, under the Conventions and other international law, which should attach to detainees. 171  The Court
held that the CSRTs did not meet the standards that would eliminate the need for a habeas review. 172
However, the case was decided 5-4 with vehement dissents by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia. 173  Chief Justice
Roberts began his dissent, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, by stating:
Today the Court strikes down as inadequate the most generous set of procedural protections ever
afforded aliens detained by this country as enemy combatants. The political branches crafted these
procedures amidst an ongoing military conflict, after much careful investigation and thorough
debate .... The majority merely replaces a review system designed by the people's representatives
with a set of shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts at some future date. 174
Justice Scalia began his dissent in similar fashion, stating: “Today, for the first time in our Nation's history, the Court
confers a constitutional right ... on alien enemies detained abroad by our military forces in the course of an ongoing
war.” 175  He went as far to say that “[t]he game of bait-and-switch that today's opinion plays upon the Nation's
Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us. It will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.” 176  He
also stated that the standard set forth in majority's opinion would ensure that “how to handle enemy prisoners in this
war will ultimately lie with the branch that knows least about the national security concerns that the subject entails.” 177
B. The Obama Administration: Different Approach, Similar Result
When Barack Obama was running for president in the 2008 election, he promised he would be the polar opposite of the
Bush *619  administration when it came to combating terrorism. 178  He vowed that the United States would not engage
in the practice of torturing combatants, that Guantanamo Bay would be closed, that military commissions would be no
more, that detainees would not be held indefinitely, and that the United States would “regain international respect for
the manner in which the United States fought its battles.” 179  Members of President Obama's administration felt that
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the Bush administration had created a “double standard” that the United States was applying to international human
rights law. 180  They reasoned that the United States applied one standard to its own conduct, and another standard to
the rest of the world.
From the outset, President Obama hoped to institute fundamental policy changes in his administration. On his second
day in office, President Obama signed an executive order to close Guantanamo as soon as possible, and no later than a
year from the date of the order. 181  His administration also dropped the term “enemy combatants” and instead began
using the term “unprivileged enemy belligerents,” though some felt that this status change amounted to little actual
change in application and operation. 182  Hina Shamsi, an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union, said that
“[i]n key elements [the Obama administration's policies] are a continuation of the Bush administration.” 183  The Center
for Constitutional Rights said, “[t]his is really a case of old wine in new bottles.” 184
In a speech on national security delivered in May of 2009, President Obama criticized the approach of the Bush era and
laid out  *620  a framework of his own. 185  While attacking the previous administration for instituting an ineffective and
unsustainable “framework that failed to rely on our legal traditions and time-tested institutions, and that failed to use
our values as a compass,” President Obama promised to work with Congress moving forward. 186  In the same speech,
President Obama laid out his plan for the various groups of Guantanamo detainees, “an announcement that proved to
be a harbinger of future difficulties.” 187  President Obama explained that:
[S]ome [detainees] would be tried in federal courts (for violations of federal law); a second group
would be tried by reconstituted military commissions (for violations of laws of war); the third group
had been ordered released by the courts; the fourth group were those deemed safe to transfer to
other countries; and the fifth group were those who could neither be tried nor released--in other
words, they would have to be subject to “prolonged detention.” 188
Also in 2009, President Obama announced he would consider restarting the military commission system, though he had
voted against it in 2006 and campaigned on abolishing its usage in 2007 and 2008. 189  Congress enacted the Military
Commissions Act of 2009, improving upon the MCA of 2006. 190  The 2009 amendments “provide[] additional procedural
safeguards, including tighter restrictions on the admission of hearsay and additional protections against the use of
coerced evidence, [and] maintains the same substantive offenses [from the MCA of 2006].” 191  It also set Common Article
3 of the Conventions as the baseline treatment to be afforded to detainees. 192  The MCA of 2009 defined the Obama
administration's new status of “unprivileged enemy belligerent” as “someone who either engaged in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners; or someone who purposefully and *621  materially supported hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners.” 193
Though the new MCA was an improvement upon the first and provided a more appropriate venue for trying law-of-
war violations, human rights activists maintain that it is a “substandard system of justice.” 194  Morris Davis, a former
prosecutor at Guantanamo Bay, argued that military commissions were not working and federal courts would provide
a quicker, more efficient, and more effective method. 195  In taking this position, he noted that there have only been six
military commission trials from 2001 to 2012, and that two of those six were horrible war criminals that have served their
shorter military commission sentences and are now in their home countries. 196  During this time, hundreds of terrorism-
related cases have been successfully tried in federal courts, and usually resulted in higher sentences than those from
military commissions by a wide margin. 197
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Eventually, President Obama began to shift his approach to the federal justice system. In November of 2009, his
administration announced that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the self-proclaimed mastermind of September 11, and four
others were to be tried in federal court in New York. 198  However, in a fashion void of clarity, President Obama
announced five others were to be tried in a military commission. 199  When Attorney General Eric Holder announced
this decision, the MCA of 2009 had already *622  been signed into law and “all unlawful enemy combatants that had
violated the law of war ... should be processed for prosecution by means of a military commission, not a domestic criminal
trial,” adding to the lack of clarity in bringing others to federal court. 200
This announcement was a turning point for the Obama administration's agenda for combating terrorism, and was a
substantial policy shift from the Bush administration. Republicans were furious with the decision and publicly attacked
President Obama for such a drastic shift in a sensitive realm of American politics. 201  Even local New York politicians on
both sides of the aisle disliked the idea. 202  The civilian population was abhorred with the thought of bringing terrorists
into their own courts and affording terrorists the constitutional guarantees one receives when they enter the United
States and are placed in our courts. 203  President Obama reassured the population that these concerns and feelings
of uneasiness would go away when Mohammed was sentenced to death. 204  Unfortunately for President Obama, the
pressure did not subside and New York politicians' resistance compelled Attorney General Eric Holder to move the trial
out of Manhattan. 205
Two years later, in March 2011, President Obama lifted the self-imposed freeze on new military commission trials
at Guantanamo Bay. 206  Following the Republican victories in November of 2011, Congress voted to prohibit the
transfer of any Guantanamo prisoners to the United States. 207  Consequently, President Obama lost his chance to try
Mohammed and the four others anywhere in the United States. On April 4, 2011, Holder stated that the five *623
individuals would be tried in a military commission at Guantanamo Bay. 208
C. Where Does this Inconsistency Leave Us?
As President Obama's tenure as Commander-in-Chief comes to an end, the question of how and why we find ourselves
in the current legal and jurisdictional predicament for combating terrorism is difficult to answer. It is difficult to parse
out because although the approaches have been similar in some ways, the primary difference is Obama's use of federal
courts to try non-citizen, and even combatant, terrorists. 209
As one can see, President Obama fell short of the promises he ran on during his campaign. For instance, though he banned
waterboarding, “he has not managed to close Guantanamo, end military commissions, or solve the problem of detainees
being held indefinitely.” 210  President Obama has even opposed his previous views through action, signing into law the
National Defense Authorization bill in 2011, which “makes indefinite detention of terror suspects explicitly lawful.” 211
However, he and his administration did make progress with the MCA of 2009, which showed that his Justice Department
was more accepting of international law and integrating it into the American approach. The Justice Department also
prosecuted a large number of terrorists in federal courts, garnering effective results to put actual terrorists behind bars.
*624  The Obama administration took an important stance in its respect for, and implementation of, international law
and standards concerning the detainment and prosecution of terrorists. However, in the end, the administration chose
an easier route to effectuate results rather than putting the time and resources into fixing a system that needed tweaking
Fraser, Alex 2/2/2017
For Educational Use Only
FOR THE SAKE OF CONSISTENCY: DISTINGUISHING..., 51 U. Rich. L. Rev. 593
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 14
and updating. The amendments to the MCA of 2009 were important, but the choice to make Article III federal courts
the predominant venue to try non-citizen combatant terrorists put the United States on a legally unsteady and publicly
condemned platform.
President Bush and his administration were by no means perfect in their approach. They established Guantanamo Bay,
despite its questionable international legality and uncertainty for how the international community would receive it. They
also began the military commission system without Congressional involvement and rendered ineffective the applicability
of the Geneva Conventions. 212  The administration's inability to alter their course in light of Supreme Court decisions
and other problems became apparent. Supporters of President Bush would argue that when President Obama put forth
the MCA of 2009, he “placed himself squarely behind this post-9/11 legal edifice” and, in a way, agreed with the Bush
administration's approach to the commission system. 213
Regardless of the political and policy debates between President Bush and President Obama, it is tough to put aside the
difficulties that Congress, the Judiciary, and the public have faced in these grand scale shifts of approach, policy, and
execution that our executives have used to prosecute terrorists. For an area that will play an increasingly important role
both domestically and internationally in the future, American officials must lead with a more balanced and consistent
approach. A continuance of grand schematic shifts every four to eight years will negatively affect our ability to legally
combat terrorism and be an international leader in doing so. The effects of this inconsistency are widespread. What
follows is a proposed solution to achieve a legally-based, principled application of the law to eliminate this inconsistency
and bring America to the forefront of legal initiatives to effectively and humanely prosecute terrorists.
*625  IV. THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH
A. Why Distinguishing the Type of Terrorist Will Mean Consistent Application
As this comment has shown, the only consistent element in our nation's approach to trying terrorists has been its
inconsistency. Part III discussed the main driving force behind such inconsistencies, the Executive Branch. 214  Presidents
Bush and Obama turned an area that should be based on principled application of domestic--but also largely influenced
by international--laws of war into just another topic for basic party politics. 215  The solution this article presents is
intended not to strip any constitutional power from the President, but to create consistency in an area that demands it.
There are certain topics which transcend the preferences of President of the United States, especially when they involve
international players on an international scale attempting to devise international solutions to international problems. 216
This is one of those areas. The United States often takes charge in leading the global community and setting the example
moving forward, and it has the same opportunity here.
The solution this comment proposes is based on a fundamental concept that--from a purely legal perspective--all
terrorists are not created equal, and should not be treated equally in their trial venue. 217  For a long time, both the legal
courts and court of public opinion have put all terrorists into a single group. 218  We have tended to define terrorists
purely from their overarching goal, rather than the means by which they achieve that goal. 219  Though *626  their
overarching goal is terrifying, unjustified, and threatening to the civilized world, their means can vastly differ. Criminal
defendants and enemy combatants are prosecuted on their specific offenses, not their group mentality or ideological
pursuits. 220  This explains, to a degree, why terrorists are not given lawful combatant immunity, why they cannot gain
POW status under international law, why our Presidents struggle with where to detain and prosecute them, and why we
have our glaring inconsistencies in the first place.
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This comment proposes a process that can be embodied in a single question--what kind of terrorist are you? Admittedly,
the question seems odd at first, but further explanation unfolds the purpose of this question. There are two kinds of
terrorists. The first are terrorists that kill innocent civilians in public places, with no military purpose or warfare-based
strategic goal. 221  The second are terrorists that engage in warfare, within theaters of combat, against military targets
(soldiers, service members, members of a tactical force, etc.), and with military objectives. 222  Brothers Dzhokhar and
Tamerlan Tsarnaev, responsible for the Boston marathon bombing, are in the first group. Irek Hamidullin is in the
second group.
This initial distinguishing element between combatant and non-combatant terrorists is core to the solution provided in
this article and should determine where the individual is placed for trial. Non-combatant terrorists, like the Tsarnaev
brothers, San Bernadino shooters, and those responsible for September 11, should be tried and prosecuted in an Article
III federal court or in a criminal court in the jurisdiction where the harm occurred. 223  *627  Irek Hamidullin, and other
combatant terrorists engaging in warfare, should be tried and prosecuted in military commissions. The two groups, from
a legal perspective, are quite different. One is a radical civilian and the other a modern-day combatant solider. Their
conduct, their purposes, where their acts occur, whom they harm, and the laws it does or does not violate, are all vastly
different compared to the average differences between defendants. 224
There are, of course, gray areas where distinguishing between combatant and non-combatant terrorists would not be
as simple to effectuate. These differences can be settled based upon: (i) the conduct the individual is engaged in when
apprehended and its purpose; (ii) whether the target is civilian or military; 225  (iii) the location of the activity; and (iv)
whether the individual is acting alone or with an organized force with a semblance of a command structure. These factors
provide only a few examples. In fact, there are a multitude of factors that could go into this determination, creating
a totality-of-the-circumstances type of inquiry, where, applying these facts to a legal standard, the combatant or non-
combatant nature predominates and that determination is made. The point of this determination--to distinguish the type
of terrorist--is to distinguish these individuals by applying facts to an objective standard or inquiry defined by law, and
not by the political gamesmanship of Presidents.
In light of these differences between terrorists, their venue for trial should be different. As an expert in the field put it,
“[t]he inability to set bright lines of distinction between al-Qaeda unlawful enemy combatants and domestic jihadists is
not just a failure in definition; it is a failure in leadership and does tremendous damage to America's commitment to
abide by the proper rule of law.” 226  This initial determination provides a clear and easily implementable mechanism
that can eliminate the inconsistency that has plagued this legal minefield for the past decade.
*628  B. Military Commissions Must Prosecute Combatant Terrorists
In order to implement such a mechanism, military commissions must remain a venue option for trial. Military
commissions are able to prosecute combatant terrorists. 227  As explained in Part II, military commissions have steadily
improved the procedural guarantees and overall due process afforded to the enemy combatants brought there for
trial. 228  The commissions instituted in 2004 were too closed off, lacked procedural sufficiency, put defendants at a
disadvantage at trial, and did not garner support or consensus from both sides of the aisle, much less the international
community as a whole. However, the commissions have been moving in the right direction ever since. Obviously, when it
comes to needing a solution to satisfy a large group of constituents, not everyone is going to be happy. Plenty of people,
from the international community to United States's own elected officials, heavily criticize both the commissions-based
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approach and the Article III federal court approach. The commissions must maintain their structure as is, but also be
willing to listen to the international community when relevant updates are necessary. Compromise must be garnered
for consistency to be obtainable. The commissions represent “a flexible construct that Congress should have broad
latitude to interpret to advance United States security interests, including through broad criminal jurisdiction in military
commissions.” 229
First, military commissions are capable of providing a fair venue and can meet all of the requirements that international
law demands. For instance, the commissions are capable of making the initial determination as to whether an individual
is a combatant or non-combatant terrorist. Also, pleasing to the international community, military commissions making
this initial determination satisfy the Article 5 requirement under the Conventions that *629  a “competent tribunal”
determine the individual's status. 230  If it is determined that the terrorist is a combatant, the commission is well-suited
to try the combatant in a fair trial--affording the accused all the procedural guarantees and due process needed in light
of the amendments to the MCA. It is important to note here that this solution does not, in any way, aim to change
the appeal rights of the defendants tried before the commissions. Maintaining the rights to appeal to the CMCR, D.C.
Circuit, and United States Supreme Court should remain.
Second, using military commissions makes more sense from a legal expertise perspective. Military judges will be applying
military law, the law of war--which has elements of international law throughout--to military actors being tried for
conduct in violation of those laws. Combatant terrorists are in violation of the international law of war, so they should
be tried for such conduct in the venue best suited to correctly interpret the applicable law. Non-combatant terrorists are
in violation of domestic criminal law, so Article III federal judges are best suited to interpret those laws. The Honorable
Henry Hudson, presiding over the Hamidullin trial, stated at the jurisdictional motion hearings: “I'm obviously blazing
a new frontier here,” and “[t]his is somewhat of a clouded issue, murky at best.” 231  He is not the first Article III federal
judge to make such statements. 232  Even if the MCA is not perfect, it has steadily improved over time and provides the
correct legal mechanism to provide clarity and consistency moving forward. 233  This decision, where to try terrorists,
must be based on principled application of the law, not whatever party is in the White House or the agenda of a single
individual, even if that individual is elected.
*630  Third, federal courts have been used not for their expertise in handling the law of war, but simply because they
garner convictions and afford non-citizen defendants constitutional rights that normally only come with United States
citizenship. President Obama's plan to use Article III courts with non-combatant terrorists, which he has done, 234  is
in line with this solution. However, his administration diverged from that path when it decided to bring Hamidullin, a
combatant terrorist, to an Article III court for trial.
Proponents who favor Article III courts favor them largely for one reason-- results. 235  The argument is that because
military commissions have gotten fewer convictions or that the convictions get reversed on appeal, that the commission
system is irreversibly flawed. Alternatively, because Article III courts get more convictions and longer sentences, they are
better. First, if we judge a criminal system on its ability to get convictions alone, that brings up concerns for its ability to
provide a fair, impartial venue to apply the law. Simply because Article III courts are getting “results” does not mean that
they are the right results. The commission system has shown its ability to be adaptable by providing added procedural
protections. Applying the law of war to terrorist soldiers in a completely different forum does not warrant giving them
the exact same procedural guarantees afforded to citizen criminals. Instead, they should be afforded the procedures and
due process that international law demands. The commissions are now better suited to meet these demands and thus,
should be used.
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C. Why Article III Courts Are Not the Answer for Combatant Terrorists
There are multiple practical and policy based reasons why federal courts are not, and commissions are, better suited to
handle combatant terrorist trials. Practically speaking, the continued use of Article III courts in the future will further
muddle United States military law, the law of war, and international law with domestic federal law, ultimately confusing
judges at all procedural *631  levels. Academics have warned of the infusing of international law and other types of
law into judicial decision-making. 236  Further, military judges and military attorneys are better suited, have been given
the appropriate training and resources to handle such matters, and understand the true operation of military the law
and how to interpret it.
Second, the use of Article III courts allows for politicized forum shopping on behalf of the executive. The President
having the choice of forum is not the problem, but when political reasons get infused into the decision, it stains the
process. The choice must be principled--the law of war and international law can provide that. When it is not a choice
made from clear legal principles to be consistently applied, it transforms the existing uneasiness associated with forum
shopping into something worse by diminishing the hope for consistent application.
Third, an argument favoring Article III venue is that commissions do not allow for jury trials, and that this is an important
element to notions of a fair trial and fair procedure. However, a counterargument can be made that a civilian trial in a
federal court is less fair and more likely to convict a terrorist than a military commission. 237  After a two-week trial, the
jury in Hamidullin needed only eight hours to find him guilty of all fifteen counts, the majority of which were conspiracy
and attempt charges that were largely supported by circumstantial evidence. 238
Lastly, federal courts are not as capable of dealing with highly classified military information as military courts are.
The Classified Information Procedure Act (“CIPA”) governs the handling and monitoring of all sensitive information
used for litigation purposes between litigants. 239  Though CIPA is effective, it does not quell concerns of airing out
information in a full-blown trial that the prosecution or defense wishes to use. If information is used at trial, it becomes a
part of the record and is publicly available information. When it comes to cases prosecuting combatant *632  terrorists,
the United States does not want to publicize sensitive information that any individual or group could use for harmful
purposes. Military commissions are closed proceedings and much better suited at handling and protecting sensitive
information, especially when a majority of the information used to prosecute a terrorist consists of such information.
D. To Reach Effective Compromise and Consistency, The Law of War Must be Modernized
The general consensus regarding terrorists is that they do not get POW status under the Geneva Convention because
they fail to meet the test laid out in Article 4 of the GPW and because the Conventions do not apply to non-international
armed conflicts, as discussed in Part I of this article. 240  Though this is the controlling document for the law of war, and
had tremendous influence over the drafting of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, it needs to be modernized.
The Conventions were drafted nearly seventy years ago in 1949. Those involved in the drafting process were naturally
accustomed to war in that era. However, no one can disagree that warfare today is dramatically different than the warfare
of most of the twentieth century. 241  The idea of giving a combatant terrorist POW status along with the protections
that attach to this status has been met with the general assertion that it violates the law of war. 242  However, warfare
today is different and the laws, like any other in a changing environment, must be updated.
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The suggested updates are two-fold: (1) amend the four part test under Article 4 of the GPW, using the initial
determination of combatant or non-combatant terrorist to determine status and appropriate venue, 243  and (2) apply the
Third Geneva Convention--the *633  GPW--to non-international armed conflicts. Most militant groups today would
fail to meet the four-part test under the current Article 4 of the GPW, which determines if the individual is a lawful
or unlawful combatant. Moreover, most conflicts fought today are no longer traditional, international armed conflicts
between two or more states, but instead are non-international armed conflicts between states and/or various groups and
factions. If the United States keeps applying these laws as they currently are, it will essentially render the old definitions
and rules of law useless because they will never be able to be applied in the modern context. Thus, if we continue on
this path, the number of “legal” POWs will be overcome by the number of detained combatant soldiers that can easily
fall into the legal no man's land similar to that which occurred at Guantanamo Bay and resulted in the inconsistent
application of legal principles, as previously discussed.
Combatant terrorists are the POWs of today's wars, and should be treated as such. In order to ensure that they receive fair
and humane treatment, along with a fair trial before a military commission, combatant terrorists should receive POW
status and the international legal protections that attach. Affording these individuals POW status does not mean the law
must condone their organization as a lawful fighting body. Terrorist groups are, and should remain, in violation of the
law of war for how they fight wars and the tactics they use against civilians. This requirement is identical to the already
existing last prong of the four-part test in Article 4, which states that the individual must be a member of a group that
abides by the law of war. 244  This prong is important and must remain in order to prosecute these combatant terrorists
for violating the laws of war as a group, even if, as in Hamidullin's case, his individual conduct on the battlefield would
not violate the law of war. Being a member of the Taliban, or any other terrorist group, must remain a violation of the
law of war. Making this change to the laws of war will not affect the United States' ability to detain these individuals or
interrogate them for valuable information. After all, POWs are allowed, under international *634  law, to be detained
until the end of hostilities. 245  This suggestion is similar to the previously discussed Protocol I, which attempted to
include “non-uniformed” fighters who failed to follow the laws of war as POWs and protected by the Conventions.
Most allied countries have ratified Protocol I, and the United States should as well as it seeks to be a leader combating
terrorism. This change also acts as a bargaining chip to ensure more consensus approval from both sides of the aisle
as to how our country handles prosecuting terrorists moving forward. Affording combatant terrorists POW protection
in conjunction with a principled application of commonsense legal principles to determine trial venue puts the United
States on a stronger, more consistent, and more internationally accepted legal footing for prosecuting terrorists.
CONCLUSION
With the devastating terror attacks of September 11 ... terrorism is no longer exclusively just another
criminal offense to be investigated by the [F.B.I.] and handed over to an Assistant U.S. Attorney for
prosecution .... [t]he proper rule of law is not domestic criminal law, but the law of war. This simple
common sense distinction is largely lost on a bilious sea of political and ideological distortion. 246
As the all-encompassing fight against terrorism wages on, it is important that the United States is consistent with the
international community and that they act in concert with one another. The inconsistencies of the past have spun
domestic and international policies into a tornado of muddled law and political gamesmanship when prosecuting
international terrorists. Allowing for the preliminary distinguishing determination and the proposed amendments to
the law of war helps the United States accomplish its goal of a more consistent application of laws--both domestically
and abroad--with those of the international community. In addition to gaining consistency, the initial determination
practice described above modernizes the law of war and affords combatant terrorists POW status, which allows an easily
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interpretable policy with potential for establishing uniformity *635  amongst our allies in the fight against terrorism.
This streamlined process will lead to less forum shopping, less politicizing the choice of forum decision, and--most
importantly--more consistency through the principled application of laws carefully tailored to tackle the realities and
challenges of modern warfare.
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